Inequality of Opportunity and Inequality of Effort: a Canonical Growth Model by Marrero, Gustavo A. & Rodríguez, Juan G.
Inequality of Opportunity and Inequality of E¤ort:
a Canonical Growth Model
Gustavo A. Marrero
University of La Laguna and CAERP (Spain)
Juan G. Rodríguezy
University Complutense of Madrid (Spain)
(Preliminary version. Please, do not quote without the permission of the authors)
July 14, 2012
Abstract
Theoretical and empirical studies exploring the e¤ects of income in-
equality upon growth reach a disappointing inconclusive result. Some
recent empirical papers have emphasized that one reason for this ambi-
guity could be that income inequality is actually a composite measure
of inequality of opportunity (IO) and inequality of e¤ort (IE). These
types of inequality would a¤ect growth through opposite channels, so
the relationship between inequality and growth would depend on which
component is larger. Based on this preliminary empirical result, we
build an intergenerational model with human capital of inequality and
development. The existence of a trap in the process of human capi-
tal accumulation generates multiplicity of equilibria and permits the
inclusion of social mobility in the analysis.
The model is able to explain how IO and IE a¤ect human capi-
tal accumulation and hence ongoing long-run growth. The existence
of social mobility in society makes the relationship between income in-
equality and growth to be non-linear, and the nal sign of the inuence
of inequality on growth to be dependent on the degree of development
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and overall inequality of the economy. We nd that IE is generally
benecial to human capital accumulation and, therefore, to ongoing
growth, while IO positively a¤ects human capital (income) only for
less developed economies.
Keywords: inequality of opportunity; social mobility; human cap-
ital; economic growth.
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1 Introduction
On February 9, 2012, a fellow of the Center on Children and Families Brook-
ings Institution, Scott Winship, declared for the Senate Budget Committee
that the problem with most discussions of income inequality is that they
do not distinguish between good and bad inequality. In a world of perfect
equality, there would be no rewards for hard work or risk, which would crip-
ple economic growth. At the same time, as pointed out by the Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers to the US President, Alan Krueger, in
his talk on "The rise and consequences of inequality in the United States"
at the Center for American Progress, higher inequality might hurt US eco-
nomic growth, among other things, by reducing intergenerational mobility.1
As with cholesterol, there would be two kinds of inequality, inequality that
enhances growth (good inequality) and inequality that harms growth (bad
inequality). This is in a nutshell the inequality as cholesterolhypothesis.2
In this paper we try to disentangle the e¤ect of both kinds of inequality
on growth by presenting an intergenerational model with human capital of
inequality and development, where the e¤ects of e¤ort (good source of in-
equality) and lack of opportunity (bad source of inequality) are explicitly
distinguished.
A surge of literature on the e¤ect of income inequality on development
and growth has emerged over the last two decades, leading to controversial
conclusions.3 On one hand, the theoretical literature has suggested many
channels through which inequality could (positively or negatively) a¤ect eco-
nomic growth. Unfortunately, the vast empirical literature has not found a
channel with a predominant inuence. As a result, the empirical relation-
ship between income inequality and growth is also ambiguous.4 As pointed
out by Partridge (1997 and 2005), Barro (2000), Bleaney and Nishizama
(2004) and Voitchovsky (2005), this ambiguity could be due to the fact
that inequality may a¤ect growth through distinct avenues that o¤set to
each other. In this respect, recent contributions by the World Bank (2006),
Bourguignon et al. (2007a) and Marrero and Rodríguez (2010) have noted
1For this author rising inequality in the United States has increased the intergeneration
earnings elasticity, i.e., the capacity of parents earnings for predicting their childs future
earnings (he called this relationship the "Great Gatsby Curve").
2For more on this issue read the blog: http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/
rising-inequality-in-the-united-states-lessons-from-developing-countries.
3Surveys on this issue can be found in Bénabou (1996), Bourguignon (1996), Aghion
et al. (1999), Bertola et al. (2005) and Ehrhart (2009).
4See Banerjee and Duo (2003) on the inconclusiveness of the cross-country empirical
literature on economic inequality and growth.
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that inequality of opportunities could exert a di¤erent e¤ect (i.e., negative)
on growth (or development) than inequality of (pure) e¤ort, whose impact
would be positive. Accordingly, the reason for the ambiguous relationship
between overall inequality and development would be that income inequality
is actually a composite measure of inequality of opportunity and inequality
of (pure) e¤ort. A complementary explanation proposed by Galor and Moav
(2004) shows that the relationship between inequality and growth changes
with the degree of development of the economy: positive at the former stages
of development, when physical capital is more important than human cap-
ital in the process of development; and negative in a second stage, when
human capital takes the lead as the most important factor favoring growth
and development.
In a parallel way, a vast growth literature has emphasized the role of
human capital in development and growth (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Lucas,
1988; Barro, 2000). Indeed, there is growing consensus that human capital
is the main immediate factor of development and growth in economies. For
example, Glaeser et al. (2004) have recently argued that human capital
is even a more basic source of growth than institutions.5 Taking human
capital as the main engine of development and growth, the main goal of
this paper is to characterize the relationship between di¤erent sources of
inequality (opportunities and pure e¤ort) and the average human capital
in the economy. To this goal, we build an overlapping generation economy
with heterogenous agents and populated by a continuum of dynasties, with
human capital formation and wage determination (Lucas, 1988; Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992; Galor and Tsidon, 1997; Boldrin and Montes, 2005; Galor
and Moav, 2004). The model attempts to combine the basic principles of
the inequality of opportunity literature, with that of wage determination and
human capital accumulation. Individuals of the dynasty accumulate human
capital by an individual e¤ort decision, although the nal amount of human
capital accumulated depends also on a set of factors that are beyond individ-
uals control, which are referred as circumstances. Individual circumstances
are related to parental status and socioeconomic background, race, health
endowments, nationality, etc..6 For example, high parental human capital
5Following the works of Lipset (1960), Przeworski (2004a and 2004b) and Barro (1997),
Glaeser et al. (2004) show that countries that emerge from poverty but have accumulated
human and physical capital under dictatorships, are increasingly likely to improve their
institutions.
6The important role of circumstances has been largely emphasized in the literature
of inequality of opportunity. For example, Roemer (1998 and 2000) and Bowles et al.
(2005), among others, have shown that even if individuals have high inborn talent, the
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creates a better environment for the accumulation of human capital (i.e.,
local home environmental externality, Galor and Tsidon, 1997), and favors
the bequest devoted to the o¤spring in the form of the quality of schooling
(Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992). The ultimate sources of heterogeneity in
the model come from individual aversion to e¤ort, individual purely exoge-
nous circumstances (such as race or health endowments) and initial level of
parental human capital.
Assuming that individual human capital accumulation follows a non-
convex process, we nd rst explicit expressions of the dynamics of human
capital accumulation for the dynasty. The non-convexity of the model leads
to two interesting properties in our model. First, there is multiple steady-
state equilibria (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Thus, each dynasty faces up two
potential equilibria: a low equilibrium, common to all dynasties, and a
high, dynasty specic, equilibrium. The bad equilibrium can be inter-
preted as a human-capital trap for the dynasty that shows up because the
amount of e¤ort required to scape from the trap might be too high what may
disincentive the individual to exerting positive e¤ort. This could be the case
even for a dynasty with large preference for e¤ort if it has strong unfavor-
able circumstances. Clearly, identifying and correcting for these situations
could be crucial in the design of a policy targeted to improve opportunities
and economic growth at the same time. A second important implication of
the non-convexity is the existence of social mobility. This mobility could
be upward or downward. The upward occurs when a dynasty starts
accumulating human capital at the lowequilibrium level, but future gener-
ations of the same dynasty manage to scape from the trap. The downward
mobility occurs when a dynasty starts accumulating human capital above
its low level, but future generations end up converging towards the low equi-
librium. Understanding the e¤ect of individual circumstances and e¤ort on
this kind of social mobility is, therefore, another crucial target that policy
makers should pursue.
Once we characterize multiplicity, social mobility and the particular hu-
man capital dynamics of each type of dynasties, we analize the average
human capital of the aggregate economy, its dynamics and its relationship
with the di¤erent sources of inequality at the initial period, along the tran-
sition and in the long-run. We study the di¤erent routes through which the
likelihood of their being able to realize the benets of that talent (for example, in terms
of admission to university or access to employment) will be a¤ected by social conditions.
This reasoning can be also applied to individuals with strong preferences for e¤ort. See
also, Arrow et al. (2000), Hertz et al. (2008), Blume and Durlauf (2001), Durlauf (2003)
and Loury (1989 and 1999).
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components of inequality can a¤ect the average level of human capital: the
initial percentage of dynasties accumulating human capital above its mini-
mum (above the tramp); the average human capital accumulated by these
dynasties; and, the upward and downward social mobility. Combining initial
percentages and results on mobility, we obtain the long-run percentage of
dynasties converging towards the low and high equilibria.
In addition, the relationship between aggregate human capital and the
di¤erent sources of inequality, at the very short-run and at the steady-state
equilibrium is characterized. We show that, the di¤erent sources of inequal-
ity a¤ect the average human capital of the economy through di¤erent routes
(World Bank, 2006; Bourguignon et al., 2007a; Marrero and Rodríguez,
2010; Galor and Moav, 2004). These e¤ects depend on the degree of develop-
ment and aggregate inequality (Galor and Moav, 2004; Acemoglu, 2010). In
general, the impact of inequality of (pure) e¤ort is positive, though under ex-
treme situations, it might have a negative impact on growth. For inequality
of opportunity, the e¤ect on aggregate human capital is ambiguous: positive
for less developed economies; negative for economies su¢ ciently developed.
We observe therefore that the relationship between inequality of opportu-
nity and growth is non-linear and it depends on the degree of development,
while the impact of inequality of e¤ort is in general positive.
Another important contribution of the paper is that the classical decom-
position of total income inequality into the inequality-of-opportunity and
inequality-of-pure-e¤ort components is reproduced (Peragine, 2004; Chechi
and Peragine, 2010; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011). By using this decompo-
sition for the simplest case (all dynasties end up converging towards their
associated high long-run equilibrium), our model may shed some light on the
existing controversy about the relationship between inequality and growth.
In accordance with previous ndings, we show that the e¤ect of overall in-
equality on aggregate human capital is ambiguous. By using the typical
growth-inequality log-linear function, the relationship between development
and inequality would depend on the controls included in the equation, and
on whether they are related to inequality of opportunity or inequality of
e¤ort. For example, overall inequality shows a positive impact on human
capital (say development) when an additional term related to inequality of
opportunity is included in the regression, while total inequality appears to
have a negative e¤ect on development when the controls are more related
to inequality of (pure) e¤ort. Despite its di¢ culty, we extend this result to
the general case, with social mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the overlapping generation economy, solves the problem of the dynasties,
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comment on the sources of heterogeneity, the denition of circumstances
and pure e¤ort, and solves the dynamics of individual human capital for
the di¤erent kinds of dynasties that inhabit in the economy. Section 3
characterizes the evolution of the average human capital in the aggregate
economy and studies the relationship between this average and inequality
of opportunities and pure e¤ort in the short-run. Section 4 provides an
explanation for the ambiguous result between growth and inequality in the
literature and extends this result to inequality of opportunity and inequality
of e¤ort. The last section provides some nal remarks.
2 The economy
Our framework is a small open overlapping-generations economy with het-
erogenous agents, populated by a continuum of dynasties - each one indexed
by i 2 
  [0; 1] - and with perfect competitive markets. Time t is discrete
and in every period a single homogenous good is produced using physical
capital and e¢ ciency units of labor. Each dynasty i born at t consists of
a common individual, who lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood.
During the adulthood, each individual gives birth to another so overall pop-
ulation keeps constant over time. At the beginning of their childhood, indi-
viduals receive a bequest from their parent, xt 1(i), in the form of resources
to be devoted in the quality of his own education (Card and Krueger, 1992;
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992). Next, at the beginning of his adulthood,
human capital accumulation, ht(i), is determined by an individual e¤ort
decision, et(i), but the nal amount accumulated depends also on a set of
factors that are beyond individuals control. In the inequality-of-opportunity
literature, these factors are referred as circumstances (Roemer, 1993; Van de
Gaer, 1993; Bourguignon et al., 2007a; Fleurbaey, 2008), which are related
to parental socioeconomic background (family status, social connections,
child nourishment, etc.) and to factors such as race, ethnicity, health en-
dowments, gender or region of birth (Bourguignon et al., 2007b; Ferreira
and Gignoux, 2011; Li Donni et al., 2012).7 The individual works during his
adulthood and earns the labor income wt(i) according to his accumulated
human capital. Finally, at the end of adulthood, the individual decides his
consumption, ct(i), and the level of bequest to his o¤spring. By simplicity,
7 In this paper, we do not consider inborn ability or talent because innate ability is less
than perfectly correlated between generations so an explicit modelization of how talent
is allocated among dynasties is required (see, among others, Hasler and Rodriguez-Mora,
2000 and Hasler et al. 2007). Another possible source of inequality that is not considered
in this paper is luck (see Lefranc et al., 2009).
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we assume that consumption during his childhood is included in his parents
consumption (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Benabou, 2000). From now on, time
subscript is omitted whenever it is not strictly necessary.
2.1 The aggregate economy
Aggregate output Y is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Y = AKeL1 ; A > 0,  2 (0; 1); (1)
where K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, eL = Lh is the overall
e¤ective labor in the economy, with L as raw labor and h the average level of
human capital in the economy. Labor is perfectly inelastically supplied and,
without loss of generality, normalized to 1. The term A is a technological,
Arrow-neutral factor, which is assumed to be constant (i.e., there is no
technological progress in this economy). We consider a small open economy
with unrestricted international borrowing and lending, thus the real interest
rate is exogenous and equal to the world rental rate, which is assumed to
be stationary at level r.8 Since producers operate in a perfectly competitive
environment, r determines the aggregate physical to human capital level,
r = Y 0K = A

K
h
 1
)

K
h

=

A
r
1=(1 )
, (2)
and the wage per unit of human capital (or e¤ective labor) is given by,
w = Y 0eL = A(1  )

K
h

= A1=(1 )(1  )


r
=(1 )
, (3)
which increases with A, decreases with r and is constant as long as A and r
are constant as well.9
The average human capital h is determined by
h =
Z


h(i)dG [h(i)] , (4)
8Following Galor and Tsidon (1997), the choice of a small open economy is basically
based on the fact that interest rates do not change signicantly in the course of economic
growth.
9Though beyond the scope of this paper, it could be assumed that the technological
factor A depends on the average human capital. In this case, the level of e¤ective labor,
w, would encompass the evolution of average human capital as well. In this case, there
would be a (global) technological externality coming from the e¤ect of average human
capital on aggregate technology and thus on w (Benabou, 1996; Tamura, 1996; Galor and
Tsidon, 1997).
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where G [h(i)] is the distribution function of human capital, and then K
is obtained from (2). Because 
  [0; 1], h can also be interpreted as the
aggregate human capital in the economy.
2.2 The dynasty: preferences and human capital
Formally, preferences of each individual in the dynasty i are represented
by:10
u(i) = ()c(i)x(i)1    (i)e(i)1+ , (5)
where  2 (0; 1) is a parameter of relative preferences between c(i) and x(i);
() =  (1   ) (1 ) is a factor of normalization. E¤ort is considered
as a non-monetary factor that generates desutility, but is needed to accu-
mulate human capital (Agion and Bolton, 1997; Roemer, 1998), with  > 0
dening the degree of convexity of the e¤ort function; (i) > 0 represents
the individual degree of aversion to e¤ort, which is specic to individuals in
the same dynasty. Each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically
and faces the following restriction:
c(i) + x(i)  w(i); (6)
which is satised with equality because utility is strictly monotonic in c and
x. Individual salaries are determined by h(i) and w,
w(i) = wh(i): (7)
Human capital accumulation depends on personal decisions (i.e., e¤ort)
but also on factors that are beyond individuals control (i.e., circumstances).
Initially, the set of circumstances is assumed to be a composite index, (i) >
0 (Mejía and St-Pierre, 2008) and individual human capital accumulation is
assumed to follow a non-convex process,
h(i) = [e(i); (i)] =

h
(i) e(i)
e(i) < e(i)
e(i)  e(i) , e(i) = h(i) ,   0; (8)
where [] is continuous and increasing in e(i) and (i); h is some minimum
level of human capital that any individual attains even without exerting
any e¤ort.11 The threshold e(i) denotes the minimum level of e¤ort that
10See Acemoglu (2010), Ch. 10.
11A similar human capital accumulation function can be found in Acemoglu (2010), Ch.
21.6. We assume that h is exogenous and it is common to all dynasties. Instead, the level
of h could be dynasty specic or related to public provided funds, but these cases are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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an individual with (i) circumstances needs to run in order to accumulate
human capital above h (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Azariadis, 1996). This
threshold depends inversely on the set of individual circumstances, an idea
that has been extensively discussed in the inequality-of-opportunity litera-
ture (Roemer, 1998; World Bank, 2006; Bourguignon et al., 2007b). The
parameter  denotes the relative importance of circumstances with respect
to e¤ort in determining h(i). Thus, if  = 0, the accumulation of human
capital depends only on individuals e¤ort, i.e., a pure Meritocratic society
(Lucas, 1995; Arrow et al., 2000). However, if  > 0, the accumulation
of human capital depends also on initial circumstances (Rawls, 1971; Sen,
1980; Roemer, 1993).
Summing up, for  > 0, circumstances a¤ect individuals human capital
and wage in two di¤erent ways. First, (i) a¤ects e(i) and hence the likely
to be trapped at h. Second, for e(i) > e(i), (i) a¤ects the return-to-e¤ort in
terms of accumulated human capital, which is a crucial feature to evaluate
the trade-o¤ between the benet of exerting e¤ort and its desutility.
Finally, we emphasize the implications of the non-convexity of the human
capital accumulation process. First, it is a simple way to generate multiple
steady-state equilibria.12 Under certain general conditions (as we will show),
each dynasty faces up with two potential equilibria: a low one, given by h,
and a high one, dynasty specic, given by h(i) > h. This multiplicity
makes the initial distribution of circumstances and aversion to e¤ort to play
an important role on the equilibrium at which the dynasty will end up.
Moreover, it may cause the low equilibrium h to be a human-capital trap
for the dynasty. When the amount of e¤ort required to scape from the
trap is high in comparison to its return, the individual has no incentives to
exert positive e¤ort. This could be the case even for a dynasty with large
preference for e¤ort (i.e., low (i)), but strong unfavorable circumstances
(i.e., low (i)). If this situation does not change, this dynasty will keep
trapped in a zero-e¤ort and low-human capital equilibrium, which is harmful
not only for the dynasty itself, but also for the economy as a whole because
it a¤ects the average human capital in the society.
At the same time, social mobility might also be a consequence of multi-
ple equilibria. In our context, social mobility occurs when either a dynasty
12Non-convexities and multiple steady-state equilibria have been traditionally justied
in the context of imperfect credit markets (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Instead, we assume
the process in (8), which makes explicit the role of circumstances in the accumulation of
human capital. Nevertheless, multiple steady-state equilibria are also possible when there
are no convexities if credit markets are imperfect and the marginal propensity to save is
higher for richer dynasties (Galor and Moav, 2004). See also Galor and Tsidon (1997).
10
starts accumulating h but future generations manage to scape from the trap
(upward mobility); or when a dynasty starts accumulating human capital
above h but future generations end up converging towards h (downward
mobility).
2.3 Solving the problem of the dynasty
For each dynasty i, generation t maximizes utility (5) subject to (6), (7) and
(8). Given the noncovexity in (8), the individual must decide rst between
exerting e¤ort to accumulate human capital above h or, on the contrary,
set e¤ort to zero and accumulate h. For the zero-e¤ort case, the solution is
trivial (allocations are denoted with a 0 superscript):
e0(i) = 0; (9)
h0(i) = h; (10)
w0(i) = wh; (11)
c0(i) = wh; (12)
x0(i) = (1  )wh; (13)
V 0(i) = wh; (14)
where V 0(i) is the utility attained by dynasty i in this case. If the individ-
ual decides a level of e¤ort above e(i), the problem is solved in two steps
(allocations are denoted with a 1 superscript). First, taking h(i) as a given,
(5) is maximized subject to (6) and (7), obtaining
e1(i) =
h(i)
(i) 
; (15)
c1(i) = wh(i); (16)
x1(i) = (1  )wh(i): (17)
Substituting these expressions into (5), the following indirect utility func-
tion, V 1, in terms of h(i) is obtained:
V 1 = wh(i)  (i)

h(i)
(i) 
1+
. (18)
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In the second step, (18) is maximized with respect to h(i), and the solution
is substituted into (7) and (15),
h1(i) =

w
(i)(1 + )
 1

(i)
(1+) 
 ; (19)
w1(i) =

w1+
(i)(1 + )
 1

(i)
(1+) 
 ; (20)
e1(i) =

w
(i)(1 + )
 1

(i)
 
 . (21)
Finally, c1(i) and x1(i) are obtained plugging (19) into (16) and (17), re-
spectively. We elaborate on some features of these expressions below.
To close with the problem of the dynasty, we need to characterize the
incentive-to-e¤ort condition, i.e., whether V 1(i)   V 0(i)  0. In Lemma 1,
we establish this condition in terms of the minimum level of circumstances
required, e(i), which depends directly on (i) and inversely on w (aspects
of the aggregate economy).
Lemma 1 For any dynasty i 2 
 and generation t  0, the incentive-to-
e¤ort condition V 1(i)  V 0(i)  0 is fullled if and only if (i)  e(i),
e(i) = h (1+) 1 + 

 
(1+) 


(i)(1 + )
w
 1
(1+) 
. (22)
Moreover, condition (i)  e(i) implies that h1(i)  h and e1(i)  e(i).
Proof. See Appendix A1
2.4 Circumstances, e¤ort and heterogeneity
From (8) and (7), it is clear that h(i) and w(i) are increasing functions of
individuals e¤ort and circumstances. With respect to circumstances, some
of them can be seen as endogenous (i.e., those related to parental behavior,
such as ht 1(i) and xt 1(i)),13 and others are purely exogenous, such as race,
13Macroeconomists have extensily shown that parental education and resourses devoted
to the o¤springs education have signicant e¤ects on the individuals human capital,
while, for example, school characteristics have relatively little importance in determining
individual achievements (Coleman et al., 1966; Becker and Tomes, 1986; Hanushek, 1996;
Ginther et al., 2000). In our framework, it can be interpreted that ht 1 would create a
better environment for the accumulation of human capital (i.e., a local home environmental
externality, Galor and Tsidon, 1997), while xt 1 favors the bequest devoted to the o¤spring
12
health endowments, nationality, ethnicity or gender, which, by simplicity, we
group them in a composite index a(i). Bearing in mind this distinction, (i)
can be assumed to be the Cartesian product of ht 1(i), xt 1(i) and a(i)
(Roemer, 1993; Van de Gaer, 1993; Rodríguez, 2008; Ferreira and Gignoux,
2011),
(i) = a(i)xt 1(i)ht 1(i)'; ; ' 2 (0; 1). (23)
Substituting the expression xt 1(i) = (1 )wht 1(i) into (23), (i) reduces
to
(i) = (1  )wa(i)ht 1(i)+'. (24)
We assume that + '  1 to avoid increasing returns to scale in (i).
From (9) and (21), it is clear that e¤ort and circumstances are related.14
In fact, when (i) < e(i), e(i) = 0. This result accords with the inequality-
of-opportunity literature: individual exerted e¤ort is a function of personal
circumstances (beyond the individuals control) and of individual preferences
(independent to circumstances), which is commonly referred as pure e¤ort,
a factor that is under the individual own responsibility and it is represented
by 1=(i) in our case (Roemer 1998; Björklund et al., 2012).
Consequently, each dynasty is ultimately characterized by
 (i) = fa(i); (i); h 1(i)g, which is revealed at t = 0.15 Hence, hetero-
geneity in the economy comes from di¤erences in  (i). We assume that a,
 and h 1 follow mean invariant log normal, independent distributions (see
Benabou, 1996, among others):
ln a  N

ln a^  
2
a
2
;2a

; (25)
ln   N
 
ln b   2
2
;2
!
; (26)
lnh 1  N

lnbh  2h
2
;2h

. (27)
In this manner, a,  and h have constant means equal to a^, b and bh, in-
dependent to the corresponding variances. The variance of a lognormal
in the form of quality of schooling (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992). See also Boldrin and
Montes (2005) for a general discussion of this issue.
14For example, Roemer observes that Asian children generally work hard in school and
thereby do well because parents press them to do so. The familial pressure is clearly an
aspect of their environment outside their control.(Roemer, 1998, p.22).
15For t = 0, x 1(i) = (1  )wh 1(i); given h 1(i).
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distribution is closely related to any inequality index consistent with the
Lorenz curve (the class of S-convex inequality indices), such as the Gini, the
Kolm-Atkinson index, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) or the Theil
index (Cowell, 2009). For example, the MLD index, T0(x), and the Theil in-
dex, T1(x), are just half the variance of a log normal: T0(j) = T1(j) = 2j=2,
j = h, a and .16 Notice that 1= (pure e¤ort as dened above) and  have
(in logarithms) the same variance, 2 .
2.5 The human capital dynamics within a dynasty
In order to characterize the human capital dynamics of dynasty i, we rewrite
(8) in terms of ht 1(i). First, the incentive-to-e¤ort condition:
Proposition 2 For any dynasty i 2 
 and generation t  0, the incentive-
to-e¤ort condition V 1(i)   V 0(i)  0 is fullled if and only if the parental
level of human capital, ht 1(i), is higher than eh(i); i.e.,ht 1(i)  eh(i),
eh(i) = "h (1 + )


(1 + )(i)
w
# 1
#
[(1  )wa(i)]  1+' , (28)
# = (+ ')(1 + ) :
Proof. It comes directly from plugging (24) into (22), and solving the re-
sultant inequality in ht 1
Condition (28) highlights the role of parental human capital in the
return-to-e¤ort of their o¤springs and hence in the incentive to accumulate
human capital above h. Parental human capital needs to be high enough
to compensate the requirements established by eh(i), which depends on a(i)
and (i) as well as on the characteristics of the aggregate economy (w and
h); otherwise, the dynasty converges towards h. The following properties ofeh(i) are worth noting:
i. eh(i) > 0 for all (i), a(i) > 0; and it is independent to h 1(i);
ii. eh(i) can be greater, equal or lower than h;
iii. The relationship between eh(i) and all other relevant factors is as
expected: positive with (i) and negative with a(i) and w;
16The MLD index has a path-independent additive decomposition (Foster and
Shneyerov, 2000). For this reason, this inequality index is the most used in the em-
pirical literature on inequality of opportunity (Checchi and Peragine, 2010; Ferreira and
Gignoux, 2011; Marrero and Rodríguez, 2011 and 2012b).
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iv. eh(i) follows a log normal distribution; i.e., lneh  N  e; e2, with17
e = J   1
+ '

lnba  2a
2

+
1
#
 
ln b   2
2
!
; (29)
e2 = 1
(+ ')2
2a +
1
#2
2 ;
J =
1
#
ln
"
1 + 
w

h (1 + )

#
  1
+ '
ln [(1  )w] :
We next rewrite the dynasty human capital accumulation as a function of
ht 1(i) by plugging (24) and (21) into (8),
ht(i) = 
 [ht 1(i)] =

h
[ht 1(i)]
ht 1(i) < eh(i)
ht 1(i)  eh(i) ; (30)
[ht 1(i)] =

w
(1 + )(i)
 1
 
(1  )wa(i)ht 1(i)+'
 (1+) 
 .
The following properties of 
 [ht 1(i)] are worth noting:
i. 
 [0] = h > 0;
ii. 

heh(i)i = h(1+) > h;
iii. 
 [ht 1(i)] is increasing in ht 1(i);18
iv. If  # > 0, the function 
 [] is concave and [ht 1(i)] is strictly con-
cave with limht 1(i)!0+ 
0[ht 1(i)] = 1 (i.e., the function [ht 1(i)] starts
above the main diagonal, given that [0] = 0). This result comes imme-
diately from the second derivative of [ht 1(i)] and implies that individual
human capital presents decreasing returns with respect to parental human
capital.
Proposition 3 A dynasty i 2 
 with  (i) faces, a priory, two potential
steady-state equilibria: a lowequilibrium, given by h and common to all dy-
nasties; and a high, dynasty specic, equilibrium, given by h(i) = [h(i)],
h(i) =

[(1  )wa(i)](1+) 

w
(1 + )(i)
 1
 #
. (31)
17For this latter result, take logs in (28) and use the expressions in (25)-(27).
18For ht 1(i) < eh(i), 
 [] = h. For ht 1(i) = eh(i), we know from property ii) that

[eh(i)] = h(1+)

which is greater than h. Finally, for ht 1(i) > eh(i), @[ht 1(i)]=@ht 1(i)
= #

BCht 1(i)
# 
 > 0, with B and C positive constants.
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For each dynasty i, eh(i) > h is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
existence of the low equilibrium, which is, at least, locally stable. With
respect to the high equilibrium, its existence requires that eh(i)  h(i),
while the condition    # > 0 guarantees its local stability.
Proof. The characterization of h(i) comes immediately from properties i)-
iv) of 
 [ht 1(i)] and from solving the xed point h(i) = [h(i)]. Existence
and unicity come directly from the properties of 
 [ht 1(i)]
As for eh(i), the following properties of h(i) are highlighted:
i. h(i) > 0 for all (i), a(i) > 0; and it is independent to h 1(i);
ii. The relationship between h(i) and (i), a(i) and w is the following:
negative with respect to (i) and positive with respect to a(i) and w;
iii. h(i) follows a log normal distribution; i.e., lnh  N
h
; ()2
i
,
with19
 =
G
   # +
(1 + ) 
   #

lnba  2a
2

  1
   #
 
ln b   2
2
!
; (32)
()2 =

(1 + ) 
   #
2
2a +

1
   #
2
2 ;
G = ln

w
1 + 

+ (1 + ) ln [(1  )w] .
iv. lnh(i) is negatively correlated with lneh(i), with cov(lnh; lneh) =
 

2
( #)# +
(1+) 2a
( #)(+')

.20
If all dynasties would converge to their high equilibrium,  would rep-
resent the steady-state human capital average in the economy. From (29)
and (32), it is easy to show that the e¤ects of b, ba, w; 2a and 2 on e and
 are of opposite signs, while their impacts on the corresponding variances
have the same sign. Thus, an increase of 2a simultaneously raises e (i.e., it
makes more di¢ cult to accumulate human capital above h) and reduces .
The opposite relationship is found for 2 , while 
2
h does not a¤ect eithere or . The impacts through e and  can be seen as the two simplest
channels through which inequality might a¤ect human capital accumula-
tion. Looking only at these channels, inequality of opportunity would have
19For this latter property, take logs in (31) and use the expressions in (25)-(27).
20Taking logs in the denitions of h and eh, we compute cov(lnh; lneh) = E(lnh; lneh)
  e. After tedious manipulations, we obtain that cov(lnh; lneh) = 2cov(a;)
( #)(+')  
2
( #)#  
(1+) 2a
( #)(+') , which can be simplied because cov(a; ) = 0.
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a negative impact on average human capital, while the e¤ect of inequality
of pure e¤ort would be positive. However, as we show in the next section,
there exist additional routes that could make ambiguous the overall impact
of opportunity and, less likely of pure e¤ort on human capital.
After characterizing the two potential steady-state equilibria in the econ-
omy, we study the possible groups of dynasties. Depending on the relative
magnitudes of eh(i), h(i) and h, dynasties can be classied in 3 groups. Fig-
ures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the three feasible cases, while Figure 4 shows an
unfeasible situation. Depending on the group, initial parental human capital
would play a leading or a minor role in determining whether the dynasty
ends up converging towards h or h(i).
Proposition 4 Assuming    # > 0, a dynasty i 2 
 belongs to any of the
following cases:
Case 1. h > eh(i): the dynasty always converges to h(i), regardless the
initial value of h 1(i). Thus, h(i) is globally stable in this case.
Case 2. h  eh(i)  h(i) (at least one with inequality): depending on
whether h 1(i) is below or above eh(i), the dynasty converges to either h or
h(i), respectively. Both equilibria are locally stable in this case.
Case 3. h(i) < eh(i): the dynasty always converge to h, regardless the
initial value of h 1(i). Thus, h is globally stable in this case.
Proof. From Figures 1 and 3, it follows that Case 1 is characterized by
h(i) > h > eh(i), while Case 3 is characterized by h < h(i) < eh(i). How-
ever, h > eh(i) and h(i) < eh(i) (Figure 4) cannot be satised at the same
time, because that would imply that 

heh(i)i < h, which contradicts the sec-
ond property of 
 []. Hence, Case 1 and Case 3 are fully characterized
by h > eh(i) and h(i) < eh(i), respectively. Condition for Case 2 follows
immediately from Figure 2
For Case 1 (Figure 1), initial levels of h(i) depends on whether h 1(i) is
higher or lower than eh(i), but the dynasty always converges to h(i) (i.e., h is
not a steady-state under Case 1). Hence, dynasties belonging to Case 1 and
starting with h 1(i) < eh(i) initially accumulate h, but they eventually scape
from it because they show good enough exogenous circumstances and/or low
aversion to e¤ort (i.e., eh(i) is su¢ ciently small). This situation can be in-
terpreted as an example of upward social mobility. On the other hand,
dynasties belonging to Case 3 (Figure 3) and starting with h 1(i) > eh(i) ac-
cumulate human capital above h during a nite number of periods, but they
eventually converge to h, which can be seen as an example of downward
mobility. Finally, regarding Case 2 (Figure 2), there is no mobility and the
17
dynamics of the dynasty depends crucially on its initial levels of parental
education: if h 1(i)  eh(i), the dynasty stays accumulating h from t = 0
onwards, while h(i) > h for all t and converges to its own h(i) otherwise.
Fig. 1. Human capital dynamics of dynasties. Case 1:
unique steady-state, high-equilibrium
18
Fig. 2. Human capital dynamics of dynasties. Case 2:
multiplicity of equilibria
Fig. 3. Human capital dynamics of dynasties. Case 3:
unique steady-state, low-equilibrium
19
Fig. 4. Human capital dynamics of dynasties. Case 4:
unfeasible case
To end with this section, we characterize the probability that a dynasty
belongs to a particular case. Denote the probability that a dynasty belongs
to Case 1, 2 and 3 by pC1, pC2 and pC3, respectively. From Proposition 3,
we know that pC1 = Pr
h
lneh < lnhi and pC3 = Pr hlnh < lnehi. Therefore,
we have
Lemma 5 The probabilities that a dynasty belongs to either Case 1, 2 or 3
are given by
pC1 = 

lnh  ee

, (33)
pC3 = 

   #

e  e

, (34)
pC2 = 1  pC1   pC3 (35)
where  is the N(0; 1) cumulative distribution function.
Proof. See Appendix A2
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3 Human capital average and inequality
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, to characterize the evolution of
the average human capital in the aggregate economy (4). Second, to study
the relationship between this average and the ultimate sources of inequality
(individual circumstances and pure e¤ort). We assume throughout this sec-
tion that    # > 0; i.e., [ht 1(i)] is strictly concave and dynasties belong
to either Case 1, 2 or 3. For illustrative purposes, we divide this section in
two parts: the initial period, t = 0; the long-run, steady-state equilibrium.
3.1 The initial period (t = 0)
The probability that a particular dynasty i accumulates human capital above
h at t = 0 is p0 = Pr
h
lnh 1 > lnehi. To simplify notation, we dene
X = lnh 1   lneh, which follows a N  x; 2x distribution function. Hence,
p0 = Pr [X > 0] = 

x
x

, where  is a N(0; 1) cumulative distribution
function. Since h 1 and eh are uncorrelated, x and 2x are easily obtained
from (25)-(27) and (29),
x =

lnbh  2h
2

  J   1
#
 
ln b   2
2
!
+
1
(+ ')

lnba  2a
2

,(36)
2x = 
2
h + e2 = 2h + 1(+ ')22a + 1#22 . (37)
We observe that the magnitude of x depends on: the initial character-
istics of the aggregate economy (technology and preferences), represented
by the term J (recall from 29); the average characteristics of the dynasties
(levels of ba, bh 1 and b); and, the di¤erent sources of inequality 2a, 2h or
2 . Thus, economies with high x would be related to economies with ini-
tial high levels of w (i.e., according to (3), large productivity, A, and/or low
interest rate, r), initial favorable circumstances and pure e¤ort on average
(i.e., high ba , bh 1 and 1=b), low inequality of circumstances (2a and 2h)
and high inequality of pure e¤ort (2). Hence, in our economy, we could
think of x to be positively related to the degree of development. When the
economy develops, it typically shows better circumstances and pure e¤ort
on average, lower inequality of opportunity and higher inequality of pure
e¤ort.21 On the other hand, 2x is a weighted sum of the three sources of
inequality 2a, 
2
h and 
2
 . Hence, we could think of 
2
x to be closely related
21Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) found that between one fth and one third of all income
21
to the overall economic inequality. Obviously, if 2x = 0, all dynasties are
equal and initial inequality is zero.
To characterize the expression for E [lnh0], we notice that the average
human capital (in logs) accumulated by those dynasties with X > 0 is
given by E [ln (h 1) /X > 0], which is the rst moment of an incidentally
truncated normal distribution. From (30) and (28), it is clear that ln (h 1)
and X are positively correlated, so that the truncated mean is pushed to the
right, i.e., E [ln (h 1) /X > 0]  E [ln (h 1)]. Otherwise, those dynasties
with X  0 accumulate lnh on average. Hence,
E [lnh0] = (1  p0) lnh+ p0E [ln (h 1) /X > 0] ; (38)
where p0 and E [ln (h 1) /X > 0] a¤ect positively to E [lnh0].22 The fol-
lowing Lemma gives a detailed expression for E [ln (h 1) /X > 0].
Lemma 6 Assuming that (ln  (h 1) ; X) follows a bivariate normal distri-
bution, the average human capital for those dynasties with h 1(i) > eh(i)
is:
E [ln (h 1) /X > 0] = E [ln  (h 1)] +
#

x
p0

 x
x

, (39)
where  () is the standard normal density function and the unconditional
average human capital, E [ln (h 1)], is
E [ln  (h 1)] =
G

+
#

lnba  2a2 
(+ ')
+
#

lnbh 1   2h2 

 

ln b   22 

. (40)
Proof. See Appendix A3
Using (38) and (39), E [lnh0] can be rewritten as follows:
E [lnh0] = lnh+ p0

E ln  (h 1)  lnh

+M(x; x), (41)
where M(x; x) =
#
x

 xx

. This expression shows the three routes
through which the alternative sources of inequality can a¤ect E [lnh0]: i)
the unconditional mean of ln  (h 1) (taking into account all dynasties); ii)
inequality is explained by opportunities in six countries in Latin America. Meanwhile,
Marrero and Rodriguez (2012a) found that between 2% and 22% of overall inequality is
explained by opportunities in a set of 23 European countries.
22Because E
h
ln (h 1)
.
lnh 1 > lnehi > lnh by denition, the larger p0, the higher
E [lnh0].
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the probability p0; iii) the termM(x; x), a term related to those dynasties
with better conditions, i.e., those with h 1(i) > eh(i).
From (40), we observe that the e¤ect through E [ln  (h 1)] is strictly
positive for 2 , but negative for 
2
h and 
2
a. This channel was described in
the previous section when commenting on the e¤ects of inequality on . A
more equal distribution of circumstances would increase the unconditional
mean of ln  (h 1) because the marginal returns to human capital accu-
mulation are higher for those individuals who have lower circumstances.23
On the contrary, a more equal distribution of pure e¤ortwould decrease
E [ln  (h 1)] because the marginal returns to human capital accumulation
are higher for those individuals who have more aversion to e¤ort. While
these former e¤ects show a well dened sign, the relationship through the
other two channels are ambiguous and, in general, depend on the relative
magnitude of x and 
2
x (see the Proof of the following Proposition). As a
result, the overall impact of the di¤erent sources of inequality on E [lnh0]
might be ambiguous and would depend, in general, on the initial degree of
development.
Proposition 7 The e¤ect of the di¤erent sources of inequality, 2j , j =
h,a,, on E [lnh0] is characterized by the following condition:
@E [lnh0]
@2j
> 0 i¤ j(x; x) < 0, (42)
j(x; x) =
x
2x
+ "j   #

1  "jx( xx )
ln

1+

 , (43)
where "h = 1, "a = (+ '), " =  #; 

 xx

= 

x
x

=

 xx

is the
Mills ratio at

 xx

; and j(x; x) is an implicit function on (x; x)
with the following properties:
i) j(x; x) is {2 on the ( 1;+1)[0;+1) space for j = h,a,;
ii) lim
x! 1
j(x; x) =  1 for j = h; a; ;
iii) lim
x!+1
j(x;x) = +1 for j = a; h; lim
x!+1
j(x;x) =  1 for
j = ;
iv) j(x;x) is strictly monotone (increasing) in x for j = a; h, and
no monotone for j = ;
v) j(x;x) is strictly convex in x for j = a; h; it is strictly concave
for j = , and it shows a global maximum, maxx , in this case.
23See the dicussion in Deaton (2003) applied to health inequality.
23
Proof. See Appendix A4
In principle, condition (42) implies that the impact of any source of in-
equality on E [lnh0] is ambiguous. The following Corollary elaborates on the
characteristics of these ambiguities, which might be very di¤erent depend-
ing on the source of inequality. Correspondingly, the Corollary distinguishes
between the properties of j(x; x) for inequality of opportunity (Part A)
and inequality of pure e¤ort (Part B).
Corollary 8 Part A. Inequality of opportunity
For j = a; h, the e¤ect of 2j on E [lnh0] is always ambiguous. Given x,
the function j() shows a unique root, bjx, such that @E [lnh0] =@2j > 0
i¤ x < bjx and @E [lnh0] =@2j  0 otherwise. Hence, the smaller bjx, the
more likely is that inequality of opportunity a¤ects negatively to E [lnh0].
Two properties of the roots bax and bhx are worth noting:
i) bhx  bax, hence the range of x under which 2h harmfully a¤ects
E [lnh0] is larger than for 2a.
ii) bhx; bax < 0 i¤ x > p2=(+')
"
1   ln

1+


(1+)
1
 
#
, which is always satised
if the society is su¢ ciently meritocratic, i.e.,  <
 ln

1+


(1+) .
Part B. Inequality of pure e¤ort
For j = , the e¤ect of 2 on E [lnh0] depends on the sign of 
max
 =
(
max
x ) as follows:
i) if max < 0, the function () is never positive and hence @E [lnh0] =@2 >
0. This is always the case if maxx < 0 (su¢ cient condition), which is equiv-
alent to 2x >

#2
ln

1+


;
ii) if max  0, the e¤ect is ambiguous. Condition maxx  0, which is
equivalent to 2x  #2 ln

1+


, is now necessary but not su¢ cient. In this
case, there exists two positive roots, x > 

x > 0, that divide the real line
in three zones: x < 

x; x 2

x; 

x

and x > 

x. For the 1st and 3rd
zones, the e¤ect of 2 on E [lnh0] is positive, while it is negative for the
2nd zone.
Proof. See Appendix A5
We illustrate the results of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 in Figures 5a
and 5b, where the functions j() j = a; h;  are represented for two alter-
native situations. On one hand, Figure 5a illustrates an economy with suf-
ciently high initial levels of inequality, for example with 2x >

#2
ln

1+


.
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Under this situation, () is always negative, hence inequality of pure e¤ort
always benets E [lnh0]. Moreover, because 2x is high, bax and bhx are more
likely to be lower than zero, and the range of economies showing opposite
impacts of inequality of e¤ort and opportunity on E [lnh0] (positive and
negative, respectively) increases.
On the other hand, Figure 5b assumes that 2x  #2 ln

1+


, which
illustrates the case of multiple roots in (x; x). In this case, inequality
of pure e¤ort can be harmful for E [lnh0] only if x 2

x; 

x

. Despite this
latter possibility is feasible, using simulations (some of these simulations are
shown below), we can conclude that this is an unlikely situation; moreover,
whether those cases may exist, the range

x; 

x

is quite small.
Another general result is the following: inequality of opportunity is al-
ways harmful for E [lnh0] if x is su¢ ciently large, i.e., x > bax. In this
respect, it is worth noting that the average of human capital is more likely
shortened by inequality of opportunity in meritocratic economies. From
above we know that less developed economies are characterized by small
x, high inequality of circumstances (
2
a and 
2
h) and low inequality of
pure e¤ort (2). In this situation (for su¢ ciently small x), if the economy
as a whole shows a su¢ cient high initial level of inequality (2x), raising
any source of inequality (of opportunity and/or pure e¤ort) might benet
E [lnh0]. The intuition of this result is the following. A high percentage
of dynasties are trapped at h in less developed economies. Hence, raising
any source of inequality would favor dynasties with better circumstances to
scape from the trap and accumulate human capital above h. By using simu-
lations, we show below that for an economy of this type, the e¤ect of raising
inequality of pure e¤ort on E [lnh0] is much higher than raising inequality
of opportunity.
When the economy develops, x increases and the e¤ect of inequality
of opportunity on E [lnh0] turns negative, mainly because of its negative
impact on E [ln  (h 1)]. In this situation, a relevant fraction of dynasties
are now above the trap, and the aforementioned route through E [ln  (h 1)]
prevails over the other two alternatives. The impact of inequality of pure
e¤ort on E [lnh0] remains positive unless 2x is below

#2
ln

1+


and x 2
x; 

x

.
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Fig. 5a. Inequality (opportunity and pure e¤ort) and
initial human capital (case 1)
Fig. 5b. Inequality (opportunity and pure e¤ort) and
initial human capital (case 2)
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3.1.1 Simulation exercise for the initial period
We illustrate our model for the initial period by simulating an economy
at t = 0. To begin with, we x the required parameters of the model
according to the values in Table 1. Without loss of generality, we normalize
to 1 the values of h and A and assume that the real interest rate, r, is
0.05. Following the related literature, we assume also that the parameter
of the Cobb-Douglas technology  is 0.4 and the parameter  of relative
preferences between c() and x() is 0.7. In addition, we suppose that the
parameter  representing the level of meritocracy in the economy and the
degree of convexity of the e¤ort function  are both 0.5. Finally, to guarantee
that conditions  + '  1 and    # > 0 are fullled, we assume that the
parameters of the composite index (),  and ', are equal to 0.30.
Table 1. The parameters of the model
A h r      '
1 1 0.05 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.30 0.30
Next, we compute the impact of each source of inequality (T0(j) = 2j=2,
j = h; a; ) on E [lnh0] for di¤erent values of ba, bh 1 and b. In particular,
we consider these average levels equal to 0.25, 0.50, 1.0 (the benchmark),
1.5 and 2.0 (see Figures 6a, 6b and 6c). Thus, in Figure 6a, we represent
the relationship between E [lnh0] and T0(a) for di¤erent values of ba. Whenba is small (which causes x to be also small), the relationship is positive,
i.e., higher inequality of exogenous circumstances favors E [lnh0]. On the
contrary, when ba is large enough (which causes x to be also su¢ ciently
large), the relationship becomes unambiguously negative, so that a higher
T0(a) reduces initial human capital on average. Results are similar for the
case of T0(h) (see Figure 6b). However, the incidence of T0() on E [lnh0]
is in general positive (Figure 6c). Only for a small range of values of b and
2 (not shown in the Figure), we could nd a negative relationship between
T0() and E [lnh0].24 Therefore, in general, inequality of pure e¤ort helps
to increase initial human capital on average.
Finally, by comparing slopes in Figures 6a, 6b and 6c, it is observed that
economies with unfavorable (average) initial circumstances and pure e¤ort
(low ba , bh 1 and 1=b), the positive impact on E [lnh0] of raising inequality of
24Though these extreme cases are not shown, they can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
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pure e¤ort is higher than raising inequality of opportunity. For instance, the
slope of E [lnh0] for low levels of ba and bh 1 and low inequality of opportunity
is positive, but small, while it tends to innite for low levels of b and low
inequality of pure e¤ort.
Fig 6a. Initial human capital and inequality of opportunity (exog.
circumstances)
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Fig 6b. Initial human capital and inequality of opportunity
(parental human capital)
Fig 6c. Initial human capital and inequality of pure e¤ort
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3.2 The long-run (t =1)
After t = 0, the evolution of the average human capital for the aggregate
economy depends on p0 and on social mobility. Social mobility occurs when
a dynasty accumulates initially h and then covergences towards h (upward
mobility) or, the other way around, when initially accumulates above h and
then converges to h (downward mobility). As a result, the probability that
a dynasty accumulates human capital above h may change after t = 0.25
Let us denote the proportion of individuals converging to their high
steady-state in the long run by p1. This proportion would include all dy-
nasties belonging to Case 1 and those dynasties belonging to Case 2 with
h 1(i) > eh(i). Alternatively, p1 can be seen as the proportion of all dynas-
ties with h 1(i) > eh(i) (given by the probability p0) plus the dynasties be-
longing to Case 1 with h 1(i)  eh(i) (conditioning on upward mobility) and
minus the dynasties belonging to Case 3 with h 1(i) > eh(i) (conditioning to
downward mobility). Dening the proportion of dynasties moving upward
by pu = Pr [Bup], where Bup 
n
lnh  lneh > 0o\nlnh 1   lneh  0o, and
the proportion of dynasties moving downward by pd = Pr

Bdown

, where
Bdown 
n
lnh   lneh < 0o \ nlnh 1   lneh > 0o, we can dene p1 as fol-
lows:
p1 = p0 + pu   pd. (44)
This expression shows clearly that p1 can be lower, higher or equal to p0
depending on the net mobility pu   pd.
Likewise, the expected level of human capital in the long run would be
given by:
E [lnh1] = (1  p1) lnh+ p0E [lnh /X > 0] + (45)
+puE [lnh /Bup ]  pdE
h
lnh
.
Bdown
i
.
Using the denition of p1, we can rewritte E [lnh1] as follows:
E [lnh1] = (1  p0) lnh+ p0E [lnh /X > 0] + (46)
+pu

E (lnh /Bup )  lnh
 pd
h
E

lnh
.
Bdown

  lnh
i
:
25For simplicity, we have assumed that a(i) and (i) are given by the initial generation.
Otherwise, a dynasty might move randomly from one status to another, depending on the
realizations of a(i) and (i), and the resultant eh(i), at any period t.
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Note that all terms in parenthesis are positive because h(i) > h for all i by
construction. Moreover, it is expected that E [lnh /Bup ] > E [lnh /X > 0] >
E

lnh

Bdown

because h and eh are negative correlated. If this is the case,
a powerful intuition emerges. Given the value of p0, if social mobility of both
kinds decreases by the same amount, i.e., rpu = rpd, the lost in E [lnh1]
will be higher than the gain. Consequently, reducing social mobility would
be harmfull for E [lnh1]. A lower upward mobility harms dynasties with
better conditions (low aversion to e¤ort and/or good circumstances) and
higher levels of h(i), while lower downward mobility permits those dynas-
ties with worse conditions and lower levels of h(i) to keep accumulating
human capital above h.
For illustrative purposes, we analyze rst the average human capital for
the aggregate economy in the long-run when there is no social mobility.
3.2.1 The no social mobility case
Assuming no social mobility (NM) implies that pu = pd = 0, hence p1 = p0.
In this situation, we can rewrite the expression for E [lnh1] in (46) as
follows:
Lemma 9 The average human capital in the long-run when there is no
social mobility is:
E

lnhNM1

= (1  p0) lnh+ p0 + #
   #
2x  2h
x


 x
x

: (47)
Proof. See Appendix A6
We can easily perceive the similarity between this expression and equa-
tion (41) in the previous subsection. Following the strategy adopted for
t = 0, we obtain for the case of no social mobility at t =1 also the follow-
ing result,
Proposition 10 The e¤ect of the di¤erent sources of inequality, 2j , j =
a,, on E [lnh0] is characterized by the following condition:
@E

lnhNM1

@2j
> 0 i¤ j;1 < 0, (48)
j;1 =
x
2x
+ "j  
1  "jx

 xx

+
2h
2xh

# ln

1+


+

lnh  lnbh 1 + 2h2 + x2x2hi ,
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where "a = (+ '), " =  #; 

 xx

= 

x
x

=

 xx

is the Mills
ratio at

 xx

; and j;1 is an implicit function on (x; x):
Proof. See Appendix A7
The no mobility case is a very particular one and, for this reason, we
do not go any further here. However, it is worth noting the great similarity
between the results in Propositions 5 and 4.
3.2.2 The social mobility case
When considering a society with social mobility, it is no longer true that
p1 = p0. From above we have that pu = Pr
hn
lnh > lneho \ nlnh 1  lnehoi
and pd = Pr
hn
lneh > lnho \ nlnh 1 > lnehoi, which can be rewritten
as pu = Pr
h
lnh 1  lneh < lnhi and pd = Pr hlnh < lneh < lnh 1i, re-
spectively. From Lemma 2, we know also that pC1 = Pr
h
lneh < lnhi,
pC3 = Pr
h
lnh < lnehi and p0 = Pr hlnh 1 > lnehi hence, in this case,
it is true that
pu = pC1   p0; (49)
pd = pC3   (1  p0) ; (50)
p1 = (1  p0) + (pC1   pC3) . (51)
Considering these probabilities and recalling the value of E

lnhNM1

in
(47), the average human capital for the aggregate economy in the long-run
in this general case would be given by the following expression:
E [lnh1] = (p0   pC1 + pC3) lnh+ p0 + #
   #
2x  2h
x


 x
x

+(52)
+(pC1   p0)E (lnh /Bup )  (pC3 + p0   1)E

lnh
.
Bdown

:(53)
Notice the complexity of the last expression given the fact that the av-
erages E (lnh /Bup ) and E
 
lnh

Bdown

refer to the rst moment of a
truncated trivariate normal distribution.
(... Unnished section. To be completed ...)
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4 The inequality-development relationship
Over the last two decades the literature on the relationship between income
inequality and development has arrived to an unconclusive result. According
to our ndings in the previous section, the reason for this ambiguity is that
income inequality is actually a composite measure of inequality of opportu-
nity and inequality of pure e¤ort. This result has been empirically tested by
Marrero and Rodríguez (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2012). However, these
authors do not provide a formal model to justify such a result. Under the
model presented in the previous sections, we can explain the opposite impact
on growth of inequality of opportunity and inequality of pure e¤ort. But
we can go further if we assume that there is not trap in the economy. By
assuming this, we avoid explicitly all the complexities raised by the presence
of social mobility and, as a result, we are able to replicate some signicant
results found in the microeconomic literature on inequality of opportunity
and in the macroeconomic literature on the relationship between growth and
income inequality.
First, we prove that wage inequality (our proxy of income inequality) is
actually a weighted aggregation of inequality of opportunity and inequality
of pure e¤ort. This result reproduces the classical decomposition of total
income inequality into the inequality-of-opportunity and inequality-of-pure-
e¤ort components in the inequality-of-opportunity literature (Chechi and
Peragine, 2010; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011). From (20), the long-run ex-
pected level of wages, E(lnw1), can be rewritten as follows:
E(lnw1) = E(lnh1) + lnw. (54)
Among all inequality indices that are consistent with the Lorenz curve, fol-
lowing the inequality-of-opportunity literature, we adopt the MLD index,
which is dened for continuous distributions as follows:
T0(w1) =
Z
ln

E(w1)
w1

dF (w1); (55)
where F (w1) is the distribution function of wages in the long-run. After
several simple operations, it can be rewritten as follows:
T0(w1) = lnE(w1)  E(lnw1). (56)
Note that T0(w1) is always non-negative because the logarithmic function
is strictly concave.
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While E(lnw1) is given by (54), lnE(w1) comes directly from taking
logs in
E(w1) =
"
w1+ #
(1 + )
 1
 #
 [(1  )w]
(1+) 
( #)
#
E

a
(1+) 
 #

E
h

  1
( #)
i
:
(57)
Bearing in mind that a and  are independent, the last term is obtained by
substituting (24) into (20), then substituting (31) into the resultant expres-
sion of wages and, nally, taking expected values. Hence, overall inequality
in this simple case without social mobility reduces to:
T0(w1) = lnE

a
(1+) 
 #

+lnE
h

  1
( #)
i
 (1 + ) 
   # E (ln a)+
1
   # E (ln ) ,
(58)
because the constant terms cancel each other. Manipulating this expression
we obtain
T0(w1) = lnE

a
(1+) 
 #

  E

ln a
(1+) 
 #

+ lnE
h

  1
( #)
i
  E

ln 
  1
 #

(59)
= T0

a
(1+) 
 #

+ T0
h

  1
( #)
i
. (60)
Because individual circumstances and pure e¤ort follow log normal distrib-
utions, we have the following
ln a
(1+) 
 #  N

(1 + ) 
   #

ln a^  
2
a
2

;
(1 + )2 2
(   #)2 
2
a

(61)
ln 
  1
( #)  N
 
  1
(   #)
 
ln b   2
2
!
;
1
(   #)2
2

!
. (62)
Bearing in mind that half the variance of any log normal variable is equal
to the MLD index of such variable, we obtain our rst important result:
wage inequality in the steady-state equilibrium is the weighted aggregation
of inequality of opportunity and inequality of pure e¤ort.
T0(w1) =
(1 + )2 2
(   #)2 T0(a) +
1
(   #)2T0(). (63)
Note that this result does not depend on parental education because all
dynasties converge to their corresponding high equilibrium, which is inde-
pendent from h 1.
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Once we have obtained the above decomposition of total wage inequality
in the long-run, we show that the e¤ect of total inequality of wages on the
stationary average of human capital is ambiguous. To see this result, we
rst consider expression (63) and nd the value of T0(a):
T0(a) =
(   #)2
(1 + )2 2
T0(w1)  1
(1 + )2 2
T0(). (64)
This expression is then plugged into equation (32) to obtain the following:
E [lnh1] =  = 0 + 1T0()  2T0(w1); (65)
where 0 = 1 # [G+ (1 + )  lnba  ln b], 1 = (1+)  1( #)(1+) and 2 =
1
(1+) . In this case, it is clear that T0(w1) has a negative impact on the
average human capital in the long-run, which is consistent with results of
the previous section. However, if alternatively, we consider again expression
(63) but now we consider the pure e¤ort inequality term, T0(), we have:
T0() = (   #)2 T0(w1)  (1 + )2 2T0(a). (66)
Substituting this expression into equation (32), we obtain,
E [lnh1] =  = 0   1T0(a0) + 2T0(w1) (67)
where 0 = 0, 1 =
(1+) +(1+)2 2
 # and 2 =
( #)2
 # . Now, we get the
opposite result, i.e., T0(w1) has a positive impact on the stationary average
of human capital. Moreover, if we aggregate expressions (65) and (67) and
divide the sum by two, we obtain an expression including total inequality,
inequality of opportunity and inequality of pure e¤ort:
E [lnh1] = 0 +
1
2
T ()  1
2
T (a0) +
2   2
2
T (w1). (68)
This expression is even more appealing to illustrate the existing controversy
in the inequality-growth relationship: the relationship between E [lnh1] and
T (w1) depends on the sign of (2   2) ; which is undened.
Summing up, we have found that total inequality of wages negatively
a¤ects average human capital when we control for the inequality of pure ef-
fort, while total inequality of wages positively a¤ects average human capital
when we control for the inequality of circumstances. This nding might be
the reason that explains why empirical studies exploring the e¤ects of in-
come inequality upon growth reach an inconclusive result. When individual
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circumstances are specied in the empirical model, the impact of income
inequality on growth follows closely the e¤ect of pure e¤ort on human cap-
ital which is positive. On the contrary, when pure e¤ort is considered in
empirical estimations, the impact of income inequality on growth becomes
negative as it follows closely the e¤ect of individual circumstances on hu-
man capital which is negative. Therefore, it becomes apparent that total
inequality of wages can increase or decrease growth depending on the kind
of inequality, opportunity or pure e¤ort, that prevails.
5 Conclusions
There are crucial factors complementary to human capital accumulation
(race, genes, family background, parental education, social connections, in-
stallation of preferences and aspirations in children, health endowments,
etc.) that are beyond the individuals control and are non-purchasable:
there is no market for individual circumstances. For these factors the func-
tioning of credit markets is irrelevant and it causes that those with bad
complementary factors end up either investing little in human capital or not
investing. In addition, there are decreasing returns to the accumulation of
human capital. Hence, a more equal distribution of circumstances would in-
crease growth (in terms of human capital) given that the marginal returns to
human capital accumulation are higher for those individuals who have more
unfavorable circumstances. On the contrary, a more equal distribution of
pure e¤ortwould decrease growth (in terms of human capital) given that
the marginal returns to human capital accumulation are higher for those
individuals who have more aversion to e¤ort.
These are some of the results that we have obtained with an intergen-
erational model of inequality and development as proposed here. However,
this is by no means the whole story. We have also shown the importance
of considering social mobility. After taking into account this consubstantial
element of any society, the picture of the relationship between income in-
equality and growth becomes less evident. The existence of social mobility
in the economy causes a non-linear relationship between income inequal-
ity and growth, and makes the nal sign of the inuence of inequality on
growth to be dependent on the degree of development of the economy. The
model proposed here has pointed out that the way income inequality a¤ects
growth is more complex and di¢ cult than what the literature has commonly
assumed. Despite this di¢ culty, our results reveal that two general conclu-
sions can be outlined: inequality of pure e¤ort generally benets human
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capital accumulation, and hence ongoing growth, while more likely inequal-
ity of opportunity positively a¤ects growth only in less developed economies.
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6 Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of the rst part of the Proposition comes directly from plug-
ging (19) into V 1(i) in (18), using (14) for V 0(i) and solving the inequality
V 1(i) V 0(i)  0 for (i). For the second part of the proposition comes from
using (14) and rewriting (18) in terms of e1(i). Hence, the incentive-to-e¤ort
condition can be rewritten as follows:
V 1(i)  V 0(i)  0, w h1(i)  h  (i)e1(i)1+  0. (69)
From this expression, it is clear that the incentive-to-e¤ort condition implies
that h1(i)  h. Plugging (19) and (21) into (69), condition (69) can be
rewritten as
V 1(i)  V 0(i)  0,  [(i); (i); w]  h, (70)
where
 [(i); (i); w] =


1 + 



w
(i)(1 + )
 1

(i)
(1+) 
 : (71)
Finally, using the expressions for e(i) and e1(i) in (8) and (21), respectively,
and the denition of  [] in (71), we have
e1(i)  e(i),  [(i); (i); w]  h 
1 + 

. (72)
Because   0, condition (70) implies (72), which proves that the incentive-
to-e¤ort condition implies e1(i)  e(i).
A2. Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that lneh  N  e; e2 and lnh  N h; ()2i. From Proposi-
tion 3, we can express the probability pC1 in logarithms as pC1 = Pr
h
lneh < lnhi
and easily conclude that pC1 = 

lnh ee

. Dening R = lnh   lneh
and following a similar reasoning, pC3 = Pr
h
lnh < lnehi = Pr [R < 0] =

 R
R

, where R  N(R; 2R), with R =   e and 2R = ()2 +e2   2cov(lnh; lneh). The expression of R can be obtained from (32) and
(29). For 2R, we know from property iv) in page 15 that cov(lnh
; lneh) =
  2( #)#  (1+) 
2
a
( #)(+') . Using the expressions of (
)2, e2 and cov(lnh; lneh),
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we obtain 2R =
2
#2( #)2
2
 +
2
(+')2( #)2
2
a, which is indeed equal to
2
( #)2 e2. Finally, from Proposition 3, we have that pC2 = Pr hlnh  lneh(i)  lnh(i)i.
Accordingly, pC2 = Pr
h
lneh(i)  lnh(i)i Pr hlneh(i)  lnhi= 1 Pr hlneh(i) > lnh(i)i
  Pr
h
lneh(i)  lnhi = 1  pC1   pC2.
A3. Proof of Lemma 3
Assuming that ln  (h 1) and X follow a bivariate normal distribution,
we can apply the following result for truncated bivariate normal distributions
(see Green, 2008, pp. 883):
E [ln  (h 1) /X > 0] = E [ln  (h 1)] +
Cov(ln  (h 1) ; X)
x
(x), (73)
where
Cov(ln  (h 1) ; X) =
#

2h +
#
(+ ')2
2a +
1
#
2 =
#

2x (74)
(x) =

 x
x

1  
 x
x
 = 
 x
x

p0
. (75)
Thus, the result in (39) is straighforward.
A4. Proof of Proposition 4
Deriving the expression in (41), we have @E[lnh0]
@2j
= @p0
@2j

E ln  (h 1)  lnh

+
p0
@E[ln (h 1)]
@2j
+ @M(x;x)
@2j
. From the condition in (40) and the denitions of
G and J , we obtain E ln  (h 1) = lnh+ln

1+


+ #x. Then, substituting
the latter expression into the former, we nd that:
@E [lnh0]
@2j
= 

x
x
 @ xx
@2j

ln

1 + 


+
#

x

+ (76)
+

x
x

@E [ln  (h 1)]
@2j
+
@M(x;x)
@2j
(77)
for j = a; h and . From (36) and (37) it can be shown that
@

x
x

@2j
=
  1
2"2jx
h
"j +
x
2x
i
. Moreover, we know that 

x
x

= 

x
x

= 

 xx

.
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As a result, we can divide both sides of (76) by 

 xx

and obtain 1


 x
x
 @E[lnh0]
@2j
=
 1
2"2jx
h
"j +
x
2x
i h
ln

1+


+ #x
i
  #

 x
x

2"j
+ #
2"2jx
h
1 + "jx +
2x
2x
i
where
 () is the Mills ratio (Greene, 2008). Hence, @E[lnh0]
@2j
> 0 i¤ 
h
"j +
x
2x
i h
ln

1+


+ #x
i
  #

 x
x

"jx
 +
#

h
1 + "jx +
2x
2x
i
> 0. Rearranging and simplifying
terms, this condition can be rewritten as #
h
"j +
x
2x
i
ln

1+


+ 

 xx

"jx
  1 < 0. Thus, @E[lnh0]
@2j
> 0 i¤ j(x; x) =
x
2x
+ "j   #
1 "jx

 x
x

ln

1+

 < 0.
The intuition behind this ambiguity is the following. From above, it can be
shown that @E [ln  (h 1)] =@2j =   #2"j so the e¤ect of 2j on E [ln  (h 1)]
is strictly positive for 2 and strictly negative for 
2
h and 
2
a. However,
we nd that @p0=@2j > 0 i¤
x
2x
+ "j < 0 and @M(x; x)=@
2
j > 0 i¤
x
2x
+ "j   1x < 0 for j = h, a and . Therefore, we see that the last two
e¤ects are ambiguous (they depend on the relative magnitude of x and 
2
x)
and, consequently, the overall impact of 2j (j = h, a and ) on E [lnh0] is
ambiguous in general.
Regarding the properties of j(x; x), we use the following well known
characteristics of the Mills ratio (Baricz, 2008): the Mills ratio (z) is {2
on the ( 1;+1) space; it is strictly monotone (decreasing), 0 (z) < 0, and
convex, 00 (z)  0; and its limits are lim
z! 1(z) = +1 and limz!+1(z) = 0.
From the rst property the proof of i) is trivial. Moreover, we have that
lim
x! 1
j(x; x) =  1 for all j = h, a and , because lim
x! 1
( xx ) = 0.
On the other hand, lim
x!+1
j(x; x) = +1 for j = a and h, because
in these cases "j > 0; however, "j < 0 for j =  so lim
x!+1
j(x; x) =
1 1. After applying the LHopital rule, we nd that lim
x!+1
j(x; x) =
 1 for j =  (note that the Mills ratio is convex while x=x is linear,
therefore, the former converges faster to  1 than the latter to +1). To
prove condition iv), we calculate the derivative @(x;x)@x =
1
2x
  #
"j
0

 x
x

ln

1+

 ,
which is positive for j = a and h because their associated "a and "h are
positive and 0

 xx

< 0. On the contrary, @(x;x)@x can be positive or
negative for j = , because " =  # so that the nal result depends on
the levels of x and x. Finally, for condition v), the second derivative of
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j() is equal to #
"j
x
00

 x
x

ln

1+

 for all j, which is strictly positive for j = a
and h, but strictly negative for j = . Hence, for j = , the solution of
@(x;x)
@x
= 0 denes a global maximum.
A5. Proof of Corollary 1
Part A.
Condition i) is straighforward from the denition of j (x; x) (j = a
and h) in Proposition 4 and the assumption that  + '  1. To prove
condition ii), notice that j (0; x) = "j
"
1 + #
 ln

1+

 p
2x   1"j
#
be-
cause (0) =
p
=2 (Baricz, 2008). Moreover, there is a negative root,bjx < 0, if and only if j (0; x) > 0 because j() is monotone increasing
for j = a and h. From condition i) we know that bhx  bax so that the
condition for j = a is su¢ cient to guarantee that both thresholds are nega-
tive. Setting "a = + ', it is straighforward to show that a (0; x) > 0 i¤
x >
p
2=
(+')
h
1  (1+) ln

1+


1
 
i
. This condition is always satised if the
term in parenthesis is negative; i.e.,  <
ln

1+


(1+)= < 1.
Part B.
The existance of cases i) (no ambiguity) and ii) (ambiguity) is trivial
from the properties of (x; x) (see Proposition 4). With respect to the
rst case, the su¢ cient condition is obtained as follows. First, we set " =
 # and compute (maxx ; x) = 
max
x
2x
  #   #
1+#x

 
max
x
x

ln

1+

 . From
this result it is clear that maxx < 0 guarantees that (
max
x ; x) < 0.
Next, we ellaborate on @(x;x)@x =
1
2x
+ #
2

0

 x
x

ln

1+

 = 0 to obtain the
equivalent condition for maxx . By using 0

 xx

=  xx

 xx

  1,
we have maxx = x


 
max
x
x
 h 1
2x

#2
ln

1+


  1
i
. Hence, maxx < 0 is
equivalent to 2x >

#2
ln

1+


. With respect to the second case, given the
previous result, it is easy to see that maxx  0 is a necessary (but not
su¢ cient) condition for this case. In addition, it is true that (0; x) < 0
for " =  # so that whenever the roots of (x; x) exist, they are always
positive.
46
A6. Proof of Lemma 4
When there is no social mobility in the economy, we know that E

lnhNM1

=
(1   p0) lnh + p0E [lnh /X > 0]. Making use of the strategy in Lemma 3
for t = 0, we obtain
E

lnhNM1

= (1  p0) lnh+ p0 + Cov(lnh
; X)
x

 x
x

; (78)
where Cov(lnh; X) =   1 # 1#2   1+' (1+)  # 2a. Then, recalling from
(37) that 2x = 
2
h +
1
(+')2
2a +
1
#2
2 the result in (47) is straightforward.
A7. Proof of Proposition 5
We know by construction that  = 1 # (G+ #J)   # #E lnh 1 +
#
 #x, where G+#J = lnh+ln

1+


and E lnh 1 =

lnbh  2h2 . As
a result,    lnh = 1 #
h
#
 
lnh  E lnh 1

+  ln

1+


+ #x
i
so
E

lnhNM1

= lnh+

x
x

1
   #

 ln

1 + 


+ #x

+
#
   #x

 x
x

+(79)
+
#
   #
2
h
0@

x
x

2
 


 xx

x
1A+x
x

#
   #

lnh  lnbh 1
Recalling that E [lnh0] = lnh+

x
x
 h
ln

1+


+ #x
i
+#x

 xx

,
it is straightforward to see the paralelism between E

lnhNM1

and E [lnh0].
Let us divide E

lnhNM1

in two parts: E

lnhNM1
(part1)
that includes the
rst three terms in E

lnhNM1

; and, E

lnhNM1
(part2)
that includes the last
two terms in (79). Now, we derive these parts with respect to2j , j = a; h; .
After several manipulations, we obtain for the rst part the following:

(1)
j = 2x
(   #) "2j
#

 xx
 @E lnhNM1 (part1)
@2j
=  

"j +
x
2x


#
ln

1 + 


 "jx

 x
x

+1:
(80)
From the expression obtained for @E[lnh0]
@2j
in the proof of Proposition 4 we
know that the last term is ambiguous. Again, after several manipulations,
47
we have for the second part the following:

(2)
j = 2x
(   #) "2j
#

x
x
 @E lnhNM1 (part2)
@2a;
=
2h
2x
 

"j +
x
2x

lnh  lnbh 1 + 2h
2

+
x
2x
2h

:
(81)
As a result, 2x
( #)"2j
#

x
x
 @E[lnhNM1 ]
@2j
= 
(1)
j + 
(2)
j is positive if and only
if
h
x
2x
+ "j
i h

# ln

1+


+

lnh  lnbh 1 + 2h2 + x2x2hi+ "jx xx 
1  2h
2x
< 0, i.e.,
j;1 =
x
2x
+ "j  
1  "jx

 xx

+
2h
2xh

# ln

1+


+

lnh  lnbh 1 + 2h2 + x2x2hi < 0: (82)
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